A critical bug was discovered in lib ssl that allows attacker to read random 64 KB of memory of any process that uses libssl.

http://heartbleed.com/

http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2014/q2/22

http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140407.txt


Copy of the bug report:
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OpenSSL Security Advisory [07 Apr 2014]
========================================

TLS heartbeat read overrun (CVE-2014-0160)
==========================================

A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension can be
used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or server.

Only 1.0.1 and 1.0.2-beta releases of OpenSSL are affected including
1.0.1f and 1.0.2-beta1.

Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
preparing the fix.

Affected users should upgrade to OpenSSL 1.0.1g. Users unable to immediately
upgrade can alternatively recompile OpenSSL with -DOPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS.

1.0.2 will be fixed in 1.0.2-beta2.
---------------------------------------

===========================================================
Comment by Mempo security team:

This bug implications seem to be that an attacker could potentially read any memory of affected programs and 
compromise of all the data; 
Including all secrets, passwords, private keys, bitcoin private keys (!), irc logins and so on.

We recommend that users should turn off the affected applications,
upgrade the system to version that fixes this issue,
and consider all accounts compromised.

In case of crypto-currencies like bitcoin, users probably would like to move their savings to freshly generated addresses.
Warning: 
0. The SSL seems to be used only in RPC/API, not for p2p communication with other nodes, so this is would be not trivial to exploit this problem to attack any/all nodes over Internet.
1. Do not panic (do not lose money by sending to wrong address in a hurry), first prepare, make backups of old and new wallets/addresses.
2. Bitcoin pre-generates pool of spare private-keys (addresses). You should take care to generate actually new keys. One might want to start with a fresh new wallet.
Be sure to not lose any money by moving or deleting wallets in a hurry.
3. While moving more then 1 address, be mindful of possible correlation privacy leaks:
3.a. When sending money from account A to account X (X being in new wallet or freshly generated), bitcoind (and other wallets perhaps?) 
could sometime take money from other account B if you sent the full amount but there was money missing to pay the txfee; This will result in A-B addresses correlation.
3.b. Timing attack, if you move your 5-10 addresses at once it's likelly they are owned by same person.
4. In conclusion it could be best to move now the biggest account, and later carefully recycle all other savings.
5. If you already published old address e.g. for donations or trade or pools or as payout address elsewhere, remember to keep the old wallet just in case.

Affected programs:
* bitcoind
* other bitcoind-based programs
* irssi
* xchat
* probably others


You could test it like this, for various programs:

ldd /usr/bin/irssi | grep ssl
        libssl.so.1.0.0 => /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libssl.so.1.0.0 (0x000002c21954b000)

so yes, irssi does link to libssl and is therefore affected.

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Mempo actions: currently (2014-04-07) Mempo consists only of hardened kernel on top of Debian, so there
is no action we can take other then warn users;

This highlights why it will be important to in future create/use mechanism to auto-close known vulnerable 
applications and auto-restart them (both things should be user-configurable and default to stop on critical vuln).


mempo.org Mempo Project - Hardened Privacy